A Structural Analysis of Section 29(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act
Dennis M. Blackt
On January 3, 1984, Pennzoil and three Getty entities-the
Getty Oil Co. and the two major Getty Oil shareholders, the Sarah
C. Getty Trust and the J. Paul Getty Museum'-agreed to a contract through which Pennzoil would obtain a three-sevenths interest in Getty Oil. At the time Pennzoil and Getty reached this
agreement, Pennzoil had an outstanding tender offer to purchase
Getty Oil stock at a lower price per share than the eventual contract price. Under the Pennzoil/Getty contract, all Getty Oil shareholders were to receive the higher contract price, but the J. Paul
Getty Museum was to receive its money before the other
shareholders.2
Texaco, knowing that Pennzoil and Getty had reached this
contract, s nonetheless decided to take over Getty. Texaco knew
that Gordon Getty, the trustee of the Sarah C. Getty Trust, could
not under the trust agreement sell the Trust shares unless they
were in danger of incurring a loss. 4 Thus, Texaco first reached an

agreement to purchase the Getty Museum's shares. Next, Texaco
told Mr. Getty that they planned to launch a tender offer for the
publicly held Getty shares. Texaco pointed out to Mr. Getty that if
he did not sell the Trust's shares to Texaco, the shares would decline significantly in value because the Trust would be relegated
from dominant shareholder to permanent minority shareholder.
The Trust then agreed to sell its shares to Texaco.5 Texaco indemnified all Getty entities from any claims that they breached their
contract with Pennzoil.6
Pennzoil sued Texaco for tortiously interfering with the
t B.S. 1986, Texas A & M University; J.D. 1989, The University of Chicago.
The Getty entities are subsequently referred to collectively as "Getty" except where
context makes an individual actor important.
2 Texaco, Inc. v Pennzoil, Co., 729 SW2d 768, 806 (Tex App 1987) (writ ref'd by Supreme Court of Texas, no reversible error, Nov 2, 1987).
3 Id at 803.
Id at 801, 804.
1 Id at 801, 804-05.
6 Id at 800, 802-03.
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Pennzoil/Getty contract. A Texas jury found that Texaco had interfered with the contract and awarded $7.53 billion in compensatory damages and $3 billion in punitive damages. 7 A unanimous
Texas appeals court affirmed the judgment, but found that the punitive damages were excessive, and suggested a remittitur of $2 billion.8 On appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, Texaco, supported
by the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") as amicus curiae,9 contended that the Pennzoil/Getty contract constituted an
"arrangement to purchase" stock "otherwise than pursuant to [an
outstanding] tender offer" in violation of SEC Rule 10b-13. 0
Courts have interpreted SEC rules to allow stock purchases outside
a tender offer when all tendering shareholders receive equivalent
compensation to that provided in the "outside" contract." Texaco
argued, however, that an earlier payment to the Getty Museum
constituted preferential treatment in violation of Rule 10b-13. 2
Thus, Texaco claimed that, pursuant to § 29(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934"s ("1934 Act"), the contract was "void ...as
regards the rights of" Pennzoil, and Texaco deprived Pennzoil of
no enforceable rights.
Although Texaco also raised the 29(b) claim before the Texas
Court of Appeals, that court accepted Pennzoil's argument that
"Texaco is not a party whom.., rule [10b-13] is intended to protect in any way," and thus, "Texaco has no standing to assert...
rule [10b-13], and we may not speculate on whether a proper party
Id at 784.
8 Id at 866.
7

' See Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, Irk" the Supreme Court of Texas, Texaco, Inc. v Pennzoil, Co., On Application for a Writ of Error, No
C-6432, (July 1987).
1o 17 CFR § 240.10b-13 (1988). The rule provides in pertinent part that:
No person who makes a cash tender offer... for any equity security shall, directly or
indirectly, purchase, or make any arrangement to purchase, any such security... otherwise than pursuant to such tender offer.., from the time such tender offer is publicly announced or otherwise made known by such person to holders of the security to
be acquired until the expiration of the period . . . during which securities tendered
pursuant to such tender offer . . . may by the terms of such offer be accepted or
rejected.
11 See, for example, Wellman v Dickinson, 475 F Supp 783 (S D NY 1979), aff'd 682
F2d 355 (2d Cir 1982).
12 Texaco's Application for a Writ of Error, In the Supreme Court of Texas, Texaco,
Inc. v Pennzoil, Co., No C-6432 at 115-17 (June, 1987). Pennzoil disputed that any violation
of Rule 10b-13 had occurred. Pennzoil's Reply to Texaco's Application for a Writ of Error,
In the Supreme Court of Texas, Texaco, Inc., v Pennzoil, Co., No C-6432 at 117-35 (August,
1987).
" 15 USC § 78cc(b) (1982), (quoted in full at text accompanying note 20). •
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would have successfully asserted it."' 4 Because it found that Texaco did not have standing to obtain an adjudication of whether the
Pennzoil/Getty contract violated Rule 10b-13, the Texas Appeals
Court did not analyze whether § 29(b) would have provided Texaco with a valid defense in the tortious interference action. The
Supreme Court of Texas, finding no reversible error, declined to
hear Texaco's appeal. Subsequently, the two companies settled the
case for a record $3 billion. 5
These adverse decisions from the Texas courts extinguished
Texaco's state law claims. Thus, if it had elected to press its appeal
to the U.S. Supreme Court, Texaco would have been able to rely
only on federal law arguments and primarily on its claim that the
Pennzoil/Getty contract was void under § 29(b). As a result of the
Texaco/Pennzoil settlement, the Supreme Court did not decide the
effect of § 29(b) on Pennzoil's tortious interference claim. Nonetheless, the case shows the potential importance of this much ignored provision of the 1934 Act.
Section 29(b) applies to all provisions of the 1934 Act; it can
be used to void any contract "made in violation of ...

[or] the

performance of which involves the violation of," any provision of
the 1934 Act or any rule passed pursuant to it.' 6 The effects of this

voiding provision are potentially great. For example, had the
Pennzoil/Getty deal gone through, a subsequent challenge to the
acquisition based on Pennzoil's possible violation of Rule 10b-13
might have voided a multi-billion dollar merger.
Despite the obvious importance of § 29(b), it has received little attention from commentators 7 or from the Supreme Court.' 8
As a result, it is not clear who can invoke § 29(b) in a given case or
what effect it should have when invoked. This comment addresses
these two issues and examines the Texaco case within the pro" Texaco, 729 SW2d at 806-07. The SEC chose to address neither the question of
standing nor whether Texaco waived its § 29(b) defense by failing to obtain necessary jury
findings. SEC Brief Amicus Curiae at 16 n 18 (cited in note 9). It was concerned solely with
whether there had been a Rule 10b-13 violation and not whether such a violation would give
a third party such as Texaco a defense pursuant to § 29(b). Consequently, it took "no position as to the outcome of this case." Id at 4.
16 See Texaco Pays Pennzoil, Leaves Bankruptcy, Chicago Tribune § 3, 3 (April 8,
1988).
16 15 USC § 78cc(b) (quoted in full in text accompanying note 20).
1
nly one scholarly article analyzes §29(b) in depth. Samuel H. Gruenbaum and Marc
I. Steinberg, Section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A Viable Remedy Awakened, 48 Geo Wash L Rev 1 (1979).
18 The Supreme Court has interpreted §29(b) in only one case: Mills v Electric AutoLite, 396 US 375 (1970).

The Unwersity o U;ncago Law Review

[56:865

posed framework for analyzing § 29(b).
Section I of the comment discusses Mills v Electric AutoLite, 9 the one decision in which the Supreme Court has discussed
§ 29(b). In Mills, the Court enunciated only the general principles
governing § 29(b); the case thus provides little guidance to lower
courts as to how the provision should be applied in the disparate
contexts in which it might be raised. Therefore, section II of the
comment details several factors a*dourt should consider when applying § 29(b), and lays out a general framework for analyzing the
different fact patterns in which § 29(b) may be invoked.
There are two additional issues that courts sometimes must
deal with in the context of a § 29(b) claim-fashioning the proper
remedy and deciding the applicability of state law defenses. Section III of the comment addresses the proper remedies for successful § 29(b) claims. It argues that § 29(b) should be interpreted as
providing a flexible, equitable remedy. Finally, section IV analyzes
the interplay between § 29(b) and the state law defense of illegality
which might be raised in a breach of contract action. This section
argues that federal securities laws, specifically § 29(b), exclusively
govern the consequences of illegality under the federal securities
laws and that state illegality defenses are therefore irrelevant in
this context.
I. MILLS

V ELECTRIC AUTO

LITm THE

CURRENT VIEW OF § 29(B)

Section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides
in relevant part that:
Every contract made in violation of ... [or] the performance
of which involves the violation of ... any provision of this
chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder, shall be void...
as regards the rights of any person who, in violation of any
such provision, rule, or regulation, shall have made or engaged
in the performance of any such contract .... 2 0
There are, of course, many "provisions" of the 1934 Act and many
"rules or regulations" passed pursuant to it. Section 29(b) is thus
potentially applicable to widely divergent situations involving misleading proxy statements, fraudulent disclosure forms, 2 tender
1' Id.
20 15 USC
21
22

§ 78cc(b) (1982).
17 CFR § 240.14a-9 (1988).
17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1988).
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offers,23 margin trading,2 4 and any other activity covered by the
1934 Act and its amendments. Surprisingly, the Supreme Court
has not had a chance to apply § 29(b) in these various contexts.
Mills v Electric Auto-Lite,25 the only Supreme Court case discussing § 29(b) in any detail, presents only one application of the
provision.
In Mills, the plaintiffs claimed that the Electric Auto-Lite
company had violated rule 14a-9 21 which prohibits misleading
proxy solicitations. Electric Auto-Lite had solicited proxies for a
vote on a proposed merger without disclosing that all of the AutoLite directors were nominees of the acquiring company and that
the acquirer was already the majority stockholder in Auto-Lite.
The Supreme Court held that the proxy solicitation violated rule
14a-9 and remanded the case to the district court to determine the
27
appropriate relief.
In remanding, the Court discussed the possibility of invoking §
29(b) to void the merger agreement. It first validated the view of
most lower courts2 8 that § 29(b) does not make contracts void ab
initio:
We do not read § 29(b) of the Act ... as requiring that the
merger be set aside simply because the merger agreement is a
"void" contract. This language establishes that the guilty
party is precluded from enforcing the contract against an unwilling innocent party, but it does not compel the conclusion
that the contract is a nullity, creating no enforceable rights in
a party innocent of the violation.2 9
Thus, § 29(b) grants an "unwilling innocent" party a defense
to a breach of contract action brought by a guilty party. It also
provides an affirmative cause of action:
The lower federal courts have read § 29(b) . . . as rendering
the contract merely voidable at the option of the innocent
party. This interpretation is eminently sensible. The interests
of the victim are sufficiently protected by giving him the right
2

17 CFR § 240.10b-13 (1988); 17 CFR §§ 240.14d-1, et seq (1988).

2, 12 CFR §§ 220.1 et seq (1988).
21 396 US 375 (1970).

" 17 CFR § 240.14a-9 (1988).
" Mills, 396 US at 384-85, 389.
2S See, for example, Greater Iowa Corp. v McClendon, 378 F2d 783 (8th Cir 1967);
Royal Air Properties,Inc. v Smith, 312 F2d 210 (9th Cir 1962); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v
Bellanca, 288 F2d 784 (7th Cir 1961).
2, Mills, 396 US at 386-87 (footnotes omitted).
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to rescind.3 0
The Court reached a similar conclusion in Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v Lewis,3 ' decided under a provision of the
Investment Advisors Act of 1940 that is virtually identical to
§ 29(b). 2 The Court held that the voiding provision at issue "implie[d] a right to specific and limited relief. .. At the very least
Congress must have assumed that § 215 could be raised defensively
in private litigation to preclude the enforcement of an investment
advisers contract."3 3 In addition, "[a] person with the power to
avoid a contract ordinarily may resort to a court to have the con'34
tract rescinded and to obtain restitution of consideration paid.
Thus, under Mills and Transamerica,§ 29(b) provides two related rights to an "unwilling innocent" party to a contract that violates securities laws. First, it provides a defense to a breach of contract action. Second, it provides a right to rescind the contract and
seek restitution. But it is unclear whom the "unwilling innocent"
party standard of Mills encompasses. The Court did not define the
terms "unwilling" and "innocent." In addition, the Court examined § 29(b) in light of only a single fact situation. Thus, its
interpretation provides little guidance and may not govern all
cases that could arise under the section.
Voiding a contract is an equitable remedy. Thus, at a basic
level, the question of who can void a contract pursuant to
§ 29(b)-who is an "unwilling innocent" party-is an equitable
question: Would it be fair to allow the non-violating party to void
the contract? One pair of commentators suggests that knowledge
of the violation precludes the right to relief:
An unwilling innocent party... would probably be someone
who did not have knowledge of the violation, as a willing innocent party would seem to include a party who had knowledge,
but who could not be held to have violated the law. Accordingly, actual knowledge of the violation apparently would pre30 Id at 387-88 (citations omitted).

, 444 US 11 (1979).
32 15 USC § 80b-15(b) provides in relevant part:
Every contract made in violation of ... [or] the performance of which involves the
violation of... any provision of this subchapter, or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder, shall be void ... as regards the rights of any person who, in violation of any
such provision, rule, regulation, or order, shall have made or engaged in the performance of any such contract ....
11 Transamerica, 444 US at 18.
34

Id.
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clude the right to relief under § 29(b).3 5
However, this reasoning may not apply under a rule designed to
prevent coercive, rather than fraudulent, activity.36 An injured
party could know of the rule violation and still be coerced into going along. This is exactly the type of behavior that such a rule was
designed to prevent. Surely, in this situation, knowledge of a rule
violation would not of itself preclude the voiding of the contract.
Given the extensive scope of the securities laws, it is doubtful
that any per se rule regarding § 29(b) could apply across the board.
Section 29(b) advances no substantive policy of its own. It neither
prohibits nor requires specific conduct. No one can "violate"
§ 29(b). Instead, it imposes an additional sanction for violations of
other rules contained in or passed pursuant to the 1934 Act. Before
§ 29(b) can come into play, then, another rule must have been violated. Since these other rules have widely divergent purposes, it
makes sense to interpret § 29(b) with these substantive rules in
mind. Specifically, in each case, courts should interpret § 29(b) to
advance the policy underlying the substantive rule that has been
violated.37 The following section examines how courts should undertake such interpretations in the various fact patterns that arise
under § 29(b).
II. A

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING

§

29(B)

Securities rules and regulations can be divided into two basic
types: 1) Market protection rules-rules primarily designed to promote confidence in the market as a whole, without any real concern for the individual participants in the activity being regulated;
and 2) Individual protection rules-rules primarily designed to
11 Gruenbaum and Steinberg, 48 Geo Wash L Rev at 13-14 n 65 (cited in note 17). In
Blue Chip Stamps v Manor Drug Stores, 421 US 723 (1975), the Court makes passing reference to the fact that § 29(b) makes contracts "voidable at the option of the deceived party."
421 US at 735 (emphasis added). This is fleeting dictum, however, and may only have been
meant to apply in the context of Rule 10b-5, where fraud is central. Gruenbaum and Steinberg claim that Blue Chip Stamps supports their actual knowledge standard because
"[s]urely a party who has knowledge of the violation cannot be a deceived party." 48 Geo
Wash L Rev at 13 n 65.
"6Rule 10b-13, for example, is designed to discourage stock purchases outside of outstanding tender offers. Such purchases could create great pressure for shareholders to
tender their shares in order to avoid a future decrease in value from a change in control or
similar corporate restructuring.
11 See OccidentalLife Ins. Co. of No. C. v Pat Ryan & Assoc., Inc., 496 F2d 1255, 1266
(4th Cir 1974) (".... Section 29(b) is more properly viewed as an adjunct to the other remedies provided by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ... [and] should be read as complementing those remedies available to injured parties and not as being antagonistic.").
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benefit or protect a discrete group of individuals and that have
only a subsidiary interest in promoting confidence in the market as
a whole."8 If a rule is intended to protect a given individual, that
individual's interests should be an important consideration in determining whether and how to invoke § 29(b). If, on the other
hand, the rule is designed to protect the general market, the focus
shifts to minimizing rules violations and individual interests become less important.
§ 29(b) and Market Protection Rules

A.

The Supreme Court has indicated that it is particularly reluctant to recognize implied private rights of action when a statute is
designed to protect the public at large. 9 This reluctance also
makes sense in the context of applying § 29(b) to market protection rules. Voiding a contract is an equitable remedy; when the
person seeking to void the contract has not been injured in any
legally important sense, the equities in that person's favor are not
strong. The only policy reason, then, for voiding the contract
would be to aid the market by deterring violation of the market
protection rule. However, allowing a technically non-violating
party to void contracts might actually increase the incidence of
rules violations if that party is in a position to induce another
party to the contract to violate the rules. Allowing non-violating
parties to void the contract gives them the incentive to enter contracts that violate rules, with the intention of using § 29(b) to void
the contract if it turns out to their disadvantage.
One example of a market protection rule where such behavior
might occur is Regulation U, 40 which regulates bank loans used to
The distinction between laws aimed at the individual and laws aimed at the public
good is not unique to securities regulation. In Cannon v University of Chicago, 441 US 677,
690-92 n 13 (1979), the Supreme Court recognized this distinction in another context, noting
that "[tihis Court has never refused to imply a cause of action where the language of the
statute explicitly conferred a right directly on a class of persons that included the plaintiff
inthe case .... Conversely, the Court has been especially reluctant to imply causes of actions under statutes that create duties on the part of persons for the benefit of the public at
large."
31

39 Id.
40 12 CFR § 221 (1988). Regulation U provides in relevant part that "No bank shall
extend any purpose credit, secured directly or indirectly by margin stock, in an amount that
exceeds the maximum loan value of the collateral securing the credit." 12 CFR § 221.3.
"Purpose credit" is defined as "any credit for the purpose ...of buying or carrying margin
stock." 12 CFR § 221.2(k). "Margin stock" is any "equity security registered or having trading privileges on a national securities exchange," and five other types of securities. 12 CFR §
221.2(h). "Maximum loan value" is defined as "the percentage of current market value assigned by the [Federal Reserve] Board under [12 CFR] § 221.8 of this part to specified types
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purchase stock. The regulation requires that if a loan for the
purchase of stock is to be secured by other stock, the loan cannot
exceed 50 percent of the current market value of the stock being
used as collateral.,1 For example, if a borrower wanted to secure a
bank loan to purchase stock with stock worth $10,000, the loan
could not exceed $5,000.
Two policy concerns underlie Regulation U:
One concern was that credit-financed securities speculation at
times diverted financial resources from more productive uses
in commerce, industry, and agriculture. In addition, the Congress concluded that such activities created or reinforced tendencies for "bubbles" to occur in the stock market, with share
prices first rising well above intrinsic values, and then collapsing as speculators with highly leveraged positions rushed to
sell and as those providing securities credit called the loans.4 2
Thus, Regulation U is not designed to protect the parties to the
loan or any other discrete group. Instead, it is designed to protect
the market from the perceived dangers of widespread purchases of
43
stock on credit.
One can divide situations in which Regulation U is violated
into three types: first, where the borrower is ignorant of the exis-

of collateral." 12 CFR § 221(i).

12 CFR § 221.8(a).
A Review and Evaluation of Federal Margin Regulations: A Study by the Staff of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2-3 (December 1984). Broker and borrower protection were not primary goals of margin requirements, though policy makers are
presently concerned with protecting the former and Congress realized that protection of the
latter would be a by-product of the regulation. Id at 6, 126-27. See also HR Rep No 1383,
73d Cong, 2d Sess, 8 (1934):
The main purpose of these margin provisions ...is not to increase the safety of security loans for lenders.... Nor is the main purpose even protection of the small speculator by making it impossible for him to spread himself too thinly-although such a result will be achieved as a by-product of the main purpose.... The main purpose is to
give a Government credit agency an effective method of reducing the aggregate amount
of the nation's credit resources which can be directed by speculation into the stock
market and out of other more desirable uses of commerce and industry ....
"3 Until 1983, regulation U did not apply to the borrower. If a loan did not meet the
margin requirements of the Federal Reserve, the bank was the only violating party. In 1983,
the Federal Reserve promulgated Regulation X, 12 CFR § 224, prohibiting borrowers from
"willfully caus[ing] credit to be extended in contravention of Regulation [U]." 12 CFR §
224.3(b). This provision prevents a willful violator of Regulation X from taking advantage of
a bank's concomitant Regulation U violation by voiding the loan under § 29(b). However,
since Regulation X did not exist when the cases discussed in this comment were decided
and since the relatively large number of cases decided under Regulation U make it a good
example of the interplay of market protection regulations with § 29(b), Regulation X will be
ignored.
41

42
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tence of margin regulations 44 and a bank loans money in contravention of Regulation U; second, where the borrower misleads the
bank as to the true purposes for the loan and later seeks to rescind
the loan because of the Regulation U violation; and, third, where a
third party claims to have been injured by a loan that violates Regulation U and seeks to void the transaction.
1.

Unwilling innocent party.

The first fact situation involves an investor who is unaware
that federal regulations limit the amount of money that can be
loaned for the purchase of stock when other stock secures the loan.
Grove v First National Bank of Herminie is typical of this type of
case. 45 In Grove, the plaintiff was not aware that margin requirements existed, while the "[b]ank had constructive as well as actual
knowledge ... that the proceeds of the loans were being used by
plaintiff almost totally for the purpose of carrying or purchasing
registered securities. ' 46 The loans to the plaintiff violated Regulation U because they exceeded the applicable percentage of the
value of the stock being used as collateral. The court allowed
Grove to avoid liability on the loan under § 29(b).4 7
This holding follows the "unwilling innocent" investor rule of
Mills. Regulation U puts, if not "the entire burden of observing
the margin requirements on the lender, '4 then at least the majority of the burden. Banks should be required to make at least minimum efforts to comply with the regulation, a duty that the bank in
Grove did not fulfill.49 When one party is not even aware that margin rules exist, and thus innocent of any complicity, that party
should be allowed to use § 29(b) to void the transaction. In the
context of Regulation U, voiding insures minimum compliance by
the bank, the party presumed to have greater knowledge.
2.

Willing innocent party.

The second fact pattern occurs when the "innocent" party is
in some way culpable in the rule violation, such as where the bor44 Thus, the borrower would not be a violator of Regulation X which requires
willfulness.
" 489 F2d 512 (3d Cir 1973).
46 Id at 513-14.
47 Id at 515-16.
'8 Serzysko v Chase ManhattanBank, 290 F Supp 74, 77 (S D NY 1968), aft'd, 409 F2d
1360 (2d Cir 1969).

'9 Grove, 489 F Supp at 513.
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rower knows of the existence of margin regulations and misleads
the lender as to the reason for the loan. Regulation U exempts
"mistake[s] in good faith" from coverage.5 0 Thus, innocent lenders
who exercise due diligence, but could not reasonably have been expected to discover the borrower's intended use of the money, do
not violate the Regulation. In such a case, a borrower could not
invoke § 29(b) to void a loan because there would be no rule
violation.
The difficulty arises when a borrower lies to the bank about
the purpose of the loan and the bank negligently fails to discover
the deception. Courts faced with this situation have split over
whether to allow the borrower to invoke § 29(b) and avoid the duty
of paying back the loan. No court has allowed the borrower to recover damages. In Serzysko v Chase Manhattan Bank, the court
acknowledged that "[t]he law tends to look with a jaundiced eye
upon the claim of a deceiver that his victim should not have been
deceived."5 1 It found, however, that "[i]f an investigation had been
made [by the bank] it would have revealed that the plaintiff, contrary to his oral and written statements, was making use of the
proceeds of some of the loans to purchase or carry registered securities. ' 52 Because the bank failed to exercise reasonable diligence,
the court found that it had violated Regulation U. It allowed the
borrower to void the loan under § 29(b) and refused to allow the
bank to recover any unrepaid money on it. 3
The court in Goldman v Bank of Commonwealth, 4 faced with
a similar fact situation, attempted to punish both parties. It allowed the bank to recover the amount of the loan but did not allow
it to recover any interest.5 It found that "[t]he worst that can be
said about the Bank is that it did not exercise ordinary banking
procedures," while the borrower acted intentionally and "was the
aggressor in the loan transactions. '56 The result in Serzysko appears clearly wrong. Regulation U exists because margin loans are
50 See 12 CFR § 221.3(k).
'1

290 F Supp 74, 90 (S D NY 1968), aff'd 409 F2d 1360 (2d Cir 1969).

52

Id.

11 Id. See also Grove, 489 F2d at 516 ("recovery [of loans by bank] may be precluded
[by § 29(b)] even if the borrower knowingly and intentionally deceives the bank as to the
actual purposes of the loans"). It is these cases that Regulation X will most effect. Since
Regulation X makes a borrower who willfully induces a violation of Regulation U a violating
party also, it is unlikely a court today would allow such a borrower to invoke § 29(b). See
Gruenbaum and Steinberg, 48 Geo Wash L Rev at 5 n 18 (cited in note 17).
-1 467 F2d 439 (6th Cir 1972).
:5 Id at 441.
6 Id at 447.
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considered potentially harmful. In Serzysko, however, in order to
deter inadvertent, albeit negligent, conduct by the bank, the court
affirmatively encouraged fraudulent conduct by the borrower. This
will surely result in more violations of Regulation U, as borrowers
have everything to gain and nothing to lose from lying to banks
about whether they intend to use borrowed money to purchase
stock. At worst, the bank will discover the deception and refuse to
loan the money, in which case the borrower would be no worse off.
If the bank non-negligently fails to discover the deception, the borrower only has to repay the loan as planned. At best, the bank will
negligently fail to discover the deception. Then the borrower can
point to the Bank's Regulation U violation and refuse to repay the
loan under § 29(b). Any rule that encourages fraud to deter negligence is problematic.
The Second Circuit noted this problem in Pearlstein v Scud58
der & German,5 7 a case decided under an analogous regulation
governing brokers instead of banks. Nonetheless, the court concluded that "the danger of permitting a windfall to an unscrupulous investor is outweighed by the salutary policing effect which
the threat of private suits" would have on brokers.5 9 This policing
can be obtained, however, by allowing only innocent borrowers to
void their transactions. The marginal enforcement gain from also
allowing dishonest borrowers to do so seems slight. As Judge
Friendly pointed out in his dissent, "[a]ny deterrent effect of
threatened liability on the broker may well be more than offset by
the inducement to violations inherent in the prospect of a free ride
for the customer who, under the majority's view, is placed in the
enviable position of 'heads-I-win tails-you-lose.' "60
The same criticism can be levelled at the Goldman court, although it provides less incentive for fraud (and a concomitant
lesser deterrent for negligence). When the bank negligently fails to
discover deception, the borrower has to repay the loan but gets off
without having to pay interest on the borrowed money. He thus
gets free use of the money until the fraud is discovered. The preferred course when the "innocent" party is in some way guilty of
violating a market protection rule is not to void the contract and

1 429 F2d 1136 (2d Cir 1970).
58Regulation T, 12 CFR 220 (1988).
59429 F2d at 1141. Although Judge Friendly discussed § 29(b) in his dissent, see id at
1149, Pearlstein involved an action for damages and not an action to void a contract pursuant to § 29(b).
60 Id at 1148 (Friendly dissenting).
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always to require that interest be paid by the deceptive borrower
to the merely negligent lender.
The question might be closer if both parties acted intentionally, for in that case the equities favor neither party. Voiding the
contract, however, would still provide incentives for the "innocent"
party to engage in intentional wrongdoing. In this situation, the
regulation should be enforced by the government agency charged
with overseeing it (in the case of Regulation U, the Federal Reserve),61 rather than by the parties to the contract. Limiting enforcement in this way will deter the regulated party, but will not
encourage the unregulated party to induce violations.
3.

Third party attempting to void loan.

The least common fact pattern that arises under market protection rules occurs when a third party seeks to invoke § 29(b) because of an alleged injury caused by a rule violation. Such a case
arose under Regulation U in Natkin v Exchange National Bank of
Chicago.2 In Natkin, the plaintiffs endorsed in blank a number of
stocks to be used by another person as security for a bank loan.
The bank had no knowledge of the source of collateral. The plaintiffs later sued the bank for return of the stock, claiming that the
loan violated Regulation U and was thus void under § 29(b). The
Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's summary judgment
for the defendants, holding that "[a]lthough a violation such as
here alleged operates to void the contract rights of the party in
violation . . there is nothing in the section which operates to create any right or cause of action against the party in violation in
favor of a stranger to the contract."6 "
This is the correct result for three reasons. First, market protection rules in general, and Regulation U in particular, were not
promulgated to protect against particular injuries to third parties.
Thus, not even third parties who can show injury can claim that
the rule was passed for their "especial benefit."6 4 Second, allowing
third parties to assert § 29(b) to void a contract to which they were
not a party runs the risk of injuring an unwilling innocent party to
the contract. Third, allowing third parties to void contracts creates

" See id at 1147-48 (Friendly dissenting) (noting that isolated violations of margin regulations pose little threat, and when violations become widespread "we may confidently expect application of the administrative and criminal sanctions provided by the Act").
62 342 F2d 675 (7th Cir 1965).
63

Id at 676-77.

", See text accompanying note 66.
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an incentive for them to engage in strategic behavior designed
merely to injure competitors. Given these considerations, enforcement by the appropriate government agency is always preferable to
enforcement by third parties. 5
B.

Section 29(b) and Individual Protection Rules

It is in the area of individual protection rules that § 29(b)
comes into the greatest contact and possibly tension with the Supreme Court's jurisprudence governing implied statutory private
rights of action. One part of the Court's test for implied rights of
action asks whether the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose
"especial benefit" the relevant statute was passed. 6 In other
words, is the plaintiff one of the individuals the rule was designed
to protect. In the context of a contract-governing rule like § 29(b),
it is also important to ask whether the person seeking to void the
contract is a party to the contract. For, it is possible that the intended beneficiary of a rule and the innocent party to the contract
may not be the same person and that their interests might diverge.
In addition, the intended beneficiaries of a rule may be a group of
persons, such as shareholders in a corporation, some of whose interests are best served by voiding a contract and some of whose
interests are best served by affirming it.
This subsection of the comment analyzes each of these possibilities separately. First, it examines the strongest case for voiding a contract-where the person invoking § 29(b) is both a party
to the contract and a member of the beneficiary group. Next it
analyzes the case in which the person seeking to void the transaction is in privity, but is not the statutory beneficiary. Third, it examines the case in which the party who attempts to void the contract is a statutory beneficiary but is not in privity, and finally it
analyzes the situation in which the party seeking to void a contract
is neither the statutory beneficiary nor in privity. Since the parties
"IIn

a case such as Natkin, the plaintiff is not left remediless. He dealt only with the

person who took out the loan and can sue that person for return of the stock or for compensation. The case might be different if the third party officially guaranteed the loan and was
ignorant of the Regulation U violation. In that case, the bank would know the third party
existed and by extending an excessive margin loan would be putting that person's collateral
in a more risky position. In this situation, a court could more plausibly find that the bank
had a duty to the third party, and thus might void the guarantee. See Stonehill v Security
National Bank, 68 FRD 24, 31-32 (S D NY 1975) for one court that found such a duty
based on this line of reasoning.
66 See Cort v Ash, 422 US 66, 78 (1975). See also Assoc. of Data Processing v Camp,
397 US 150, 153-54 (1970) ("zone of interests" analysis for standing purposes).
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involved in each of these fact patterns have differing incentives
and interests, the courts must use a somewhat different analysis
for each of the four situations.
1. Party both in privity and statutory beneficiary.
Clearly the strongest case for invoking § 29(b) is the situation
where the party seeking to void the contract is both the person for
whose benefit the relevant rule was passed and is in privity of contract with the violating party. Voiding such contracts benefits the
statutory beneficiary at the expense of the law-breaking party with
minimal risk of harming third parties. The innocent party may
reap a windfall if the violating party has substantially performed
his share of the contract, (especially when the innocent party has
performed very little), but the court can adjust its remedy in such
cases to make the outcome more equitable."
Sundstrand Corp. v Sun Chemical Corp."" is typical of this
type of case. Sundstrand claimed that defendant Huarisa had materially misrepresented various facts regarding a company (of
which he was president and a substantial owner) with which
Sundstrand was interested in merging. As part of an uncompleted
merger agreement between the two, Sundstrand signed a stock option transfer agreement obligating it to repurchase 5,686 shares of
Sundstrand stock from Huarisa on fifteen days written notice. The
merger fell through when Sundstrand discovered Huarisa's misrepresentations. Huarisa gave notice pursuant to the transfer agreement, but Sundstrand refused to perform, alleging that Huarisa
had violated the securities laws. Finding that Huarisa's actions violated Rule 10b-5, the court declared the contract "void as regards
the rights of Huarisa under Section 29b." 9
The facts in Sundstrand represent the strongest possible situation for invoking § 29(b). Rule 10b-5 is designed to protect purchasers and sellers of securities from fraudulent misrepresentations.70 Sundstrand was a prior seller and current prospective
purchaser who was induced to enter a contract by fraudulent misrepresentations. Voiding the contract prevented Huarisa, the violating party, from reaping any rewards from his fraudulent scheme.
It resulted in no harm to innocent third parties and no windfall
For a discussion of remedies, see section III.
6- 553 F2d 1033 (7th Cir 1977).
11Idat 1051.
70 See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 US at 754.
67
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gain to Sundstrand.7
2.

Privity but not statutory beneficiary.

The second fact pattern involves a party who is in contractual
privity with the violating party but is not the intended beneficiary
of the rule violated. The case of Thomas v Duralite Co., Inc. 72 is
illustrative. In Thomas, misleading information about the profit
prospects of Duralite, a closely held corporation, led Thomas, one
of its shareholders, to sell all his shares in the company to a coshareholder.7 3 In a contemporaneous transaction, Edco and Temco,
two other closely held corporations in which Thomas had substantial investments, agreed to purchase certain materials from Duralite. Thomas sued for damages under Rule 10b-5, seeking the difference between the value he received for his stock and the true value
of the stock. Edco and Temco claimed that since Duralite had violated Rule 10b-5, they could invoke § 29(b) to void their agreement
to purchase materials from Duralite. The district court held for
Thomas on his 10b-5 claim and allowed Edco and Temco to void
their agreement with Duralite pursuant to § 29(b). 7 The district
court ruled that "[i]n recognition of the intimate relationship between Thomas and the Edco and Temco corporations existing at
the execution of the June 18, 1968 agreement, Edco and Temco, as
unwilling innocent parties to the defendants' fraudulent conduct in
violation of Rule 10b-5, are entitled to rescind any and all of their
'75
obligations incurred under the aforementioned agreement.
The Second Circuit affirmed on the Rule 10b-5 violation, but
reversed the district court's holding pertaining to § 29(b) because
Edco's and Temco's contract with Duralite was for the purchase of
inventory rather than securities. Thus, "[b]eing neither purchasers
nor sellers of securities, Edco and Temco have no standing under
'76
Rule 10b-5.
The Second Circuit failed to consider, however, that § 29(b)
might provide Edco and Temco an equitable right of action regardless of their standing under Rule 10b-5. The purchaser/seller
71 The only time that voiding a contract at the behest of a statutory beneficiary/party
to the contract may be ill-advised is if it results in a windfall gain to the voiding party. See
Occidental Life, 496 F2d at 1267 (refusing to void contract where doing so would result in

plaintiff "gain[ing] double its amount of damages. The result would hardly be equitable.").
72

524 F2d 577 (3rd Cir 1975).

73

Id at 580-83.

"I Id at 583.
71

7'

Thomas v Duralite Company, Inc., 386 F Supp 698, 730 (D NJ 1974).

524 F2d at 590.
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standing requirement of Blue Chip Stamps v Manor Drug Stores
77
applies only to private actions for damages under Rule 10b-5.
Edco and Temco were seeking an equitable remedy under § 29(b),
not damages. The district court found that Edco and Temco's material purchases were related to the fraudulent stock sale. Both
agreements were contained in one contract stating that "all the
parties recognize that the sale and purchase of the stock in ...
Duralite and the . . . purchase of said inventory of Duralite by
Edco and Temco are interrelated because of the relationship between the parties. ' 78 The district court found that [b]oth [Edco
and Temco] were under the control of Thomas and his partner Edwards, and both entered into their contractual obligations to facili' ' 79
tate the extinction of Thomas' interest in ... Duralite.
If non-beneficiary parties like Edco or Temco can show that
the contract they seek to void had a sufficient connection with a
violation of the securities laws and that they were not culpable in
the violation, then the court should allow them to use § 29(b) to
void the transaction. There is little danger of harming the statutory beneficiary by doing so, and the violating party merely loses
the gains from a contract that illegal activity procured. Once again,
the court can use its equitable powers to ensure that voiding the
contract does not produce a windfall gain for the innocent party.
Temco's and Edco's position in this case is comparable to the
Getty entities' position in Texaco. These entities were in privity of
contract with Pennzoil, but were not intended beneficiaries of Rule
10b-13; instead, the tendering Getty shareholders were. 0 There is
one important difference between the cases, however. The Getty
entities would have been aware of the rule violation since the contract was the result of negotiations between the Getty entities and
Pennzoil. The essence of a Rule 10b-13 violation is making a
"purchase, or ... any arrangement to purchase [stock] otherwise
than pursuant to" an outstanding tender offer, on terms different
than the tender offer.8 Thus, the making of the contract itself
7 Blue Chip Stamps, 421 US at 727.
78 Thomas, 386 F Supp at 729.
79 Id at 729. The Second Circuit pointed out that "another portion of that same agree-

ment provided that the purchase of the inventory was severable from the stock transaction."
Thomas, 524 F2d at 589. This possible contradiction in the contract created at most a question of fact for the district court to resolve, and it is difficult to see how a factual finding
that the agreements were related could be clearly erroneous.
80 See Beaumont v American Can Co., 797 F2d 79, 84 (2d Cir 1986).
81 17 CFR § 240.10b-13 (cited in full in note 10). Rule 10b-13 was designed "protect
people who tender their shares pursuant to a tender offer by prohibiting the offeror from
making 'outside' purchases (i.e., purchases on terms different from those in the tender of-
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would violate Rule 10b-13, and the Getty entities would have as
much knowledge that the rule was being violated as would
Pennzoil. Being so intimately involved in the possible rule violation, it would be inequitable to allow the Getty entities to escape
their contract by asserting § 29(b).82 Thus, while the Getty entities
would satisfy the nexus requirement, they would fail the non-culpability requirement and should not be allowed to void the
contract.
3.

Statutory beneficiary but not in privity.

The third fact pattern involves a party who is the intended
beneficiary of a rule that is violated but is not in privity of contract
with the violating party. This is the opposite of the previous fact
pattern and can occur whenever the rule violated is designed to
protect shareholders, and the corporation in privity with the violating party is the one in which they own stock. The corporation
may have changed ownership as a result of the contract and be
unwilling to invoke § 29(b), or it may be so intimately involved in
the rules violation that it cannot invoke § 29(b). This leaves the
shareholders the option of suing for damages if they have a private
right of action under the rule violated and/or attempting to void
the contract under § 29(b). While it is conceivable that an individual protection rule might be designed to protect an individual who
could not even establish privity derivatively, such rules, if they exist, are rare. Therefore, we need only address the situation where
a party can establish privity derivatively. The Supreme Court addressed this situation in Mills, a case in which minority shareholders of Electric Auto-Lite brought suit seeking to void a merger befer)." Beaumont, 797 F2d at 84.
82

The Getty Oil Company itself might argue that it should be able to invoke § 29(b) on

behalf of its shareholders-the intended beneficiaries of the rule. However, in such a situation the tendering shareholders should be allowed to decide for themselves whether or not
to invoke § 29(b). If Getty in fact participated in a rules violation that injured the tendering
shareholders, Getty was not acting in the shareholders' best interests. There seems little
reason to expect that it will necessarily be acting in their interests when it invokes § 29(b).
83 Some insider trading rules governing corporate officers may be justified by the protection of shareholders of the corporation from the consequences of the perverse incentives
such things as "selling short" might create. (i.e., if officers sold short, they would have an
incentive to make the company lose money to depress stock values) The general shareholders would not be a party to the relevant contract (the officer's contract would be with a
broker), nor would the corporation. Thus, although they may be the beneficiaries of some
insider trading rules, the shareholders would not be able to establish privity even derivatively. For a critical discussion of the justifications for insider trading rules, see Dennis W.
Carlton and Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 Stan L Rev 857
(1983).
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tween Auto-Lite and Mergenthaler under § 29(b). The plaintiffs
claimed that Auto-Lite's management violated rule 14(a)-9,14
which prohibits misleading proxy solicitations, by failing to disclose that Mergenthaler owned the majority of stock in Auto-Lite
and that all eleven of Auto-Lite's directors were nominees of Mergenthaler. Both the district and appeals courts held that the failure to disclose these facts in the proxy statements soliciting votes
for the merger was materially misleading."6
After laying out the "unwilling innocent" party standard, the
Court analyzed the rights of the minority shareholders under
§ 29(b). First, the Court noted that the minority shareholders were
"not parties to the merger agreement and thus do not have a statutory right under § 29(b) to set it aside.""" Next, the Court pointed
out that "[i]f petitioners had submitted their own proxies in favor
of the merger in response to the unlawful solicitation, as it does
not appear they did, the language of § 29(b) would seem to give
them, as innocent parties to that transaction, the right to rescind
their proxies. 8s7 Finally, the Court held that minority shareholders
do have a derivative right to invoke Auto-Lite's status as a
party to the agreement, [but] a determination of what relief
should be granted in Auto-Lite's name must hinge on whether
setting aside the merger would be in the best interests of the
shareholders as a whole.... [T]he merger should be set aside
only if a court of equity concludes, from all the circumstances,
that it would be equitable to do so.88
This is generally a sound approach. Allowing shareholders to
void their "mini-transactions" (i.e., their proxies) would cause a
merger to be overturned whenever the rules violation is sufficiently
harmful that enough proxies are withdrawn to change the outcome.
This avoids the problems inherent in allowing one shareholder (or
a small group) to set aside a merger under § 29(b), irrespective of
the wishes of the other shareholders. The latter rule would create a
significant opportunity for strategic behavior and might not be in
8, 17

CFR § 240.14a-9 (1988) provides in relevant part that "[n]o solicitation... shall

be made by means of any proxy statement... containing any statement which, at the time
and in the light of circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect
to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make
the statements there in not false or misleading."
85 396 US at 378-80.
86 Id at 388.
87 Id at 388 n 11.
" Id at 388.
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the interests of the shareholders as a whole.
Thus, the only problematic aspect of the Court's analysis in
Mills is its veiled implication that a small number of shareholders
might be able to invoke § 29(b) to set aside a merger if a court
decides that doing so is in the best interests of the shareholders.
Shareholders are a diverse lot, and the Court gives no indication of
how a judge is to determine their best interests as a whole. Since
shareholders invest in stock for a number of reasons, voiding a
transaction will have different effects on different shareholders, including disparate tax consequences and different effects on portfolio risk distribution. With most corporate transactions it will be
impossible to determine whether shareholders as a whole would be
better or worse off if the transaction were nullified.8 9 Therefore, it
is best to avoid the inquiry if possible.
Fortunately, the inquiry is unnecessary in many cases. First, in
those cases in which individual shareholders can void their "minitransaction," they can decide for themselves whether the transaction was in their best interests.9 " Second, in most cases where the
shareholders are statutory beneficiaries, they will have a damage
remedy that can obviate the need to search for equitable remedies. 91 Only in those cases where a damage remedy is either unavailable or clearly inadequate and there are no "mini-transactions" to void should the court even consider whether the
shareholders as a whole are better off. Such cases will be rare.
If the transaction had proceeded as Pennzoil planned, the
tendering Getty shareholders would have been in this general situation. As tendering shareholders, they were the intended beneficiaries of Rule 10b-13, but were not in contractual privity with
Pennzoil, the allegedly violating party. Thus, they might have had
a right to invoke § 29(b) and revoke their tender of shares if
Pennzoil had in fact violated Rule 10b-13. If enough shareholders
did so, the merger would be overturned. Following the dictum in
Mills, a court might have allowed an individual shareholder or
small group of shareholders to void the entire transaction by derivatively asserting the right that Getty's culpability barred it from
89 Many of the same concerns have been used to justify the business judgment rule. See
Daniel Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus Law 1437

(1985).
90 This might be done by a class action seeking to void proxies given to management,
for example. Those who chose to opt out of the class action would have chosen to affirm
their proxies. See FRCP 23.
" For example, in the context of Rule 10b-13, the damage remedy would be the difference between the amount paid for the wrongful outside purchase and the tendered shares.
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asserting. The harshness of this result, however, would probably
have kept a court from completely voiding the transaction. 92
4. Party neither in privity nor statutory beneficiary.
The weakest case for invoking § 29(b) arises when the party
seeking to void the contract is neither the statutory beneficiary nor
in privity with the alleged violating party. In this situation, the
contract should not be voided. GreaterIowa Corp. v McLendon s
is an example of this type of case. In Greater Iowa, shareholders
dissatisfied with the management of the Greater Iowa Corporation
formed the Iowa Trust, a voting trust with the "purpose of 'controlling or influencing control of The Greater Iowa Corporation.' "" The defendants traded "evidences of ownership" ' 5 in the
trust for shares of stock in the Greater Iowa Corporation. The
plaintiffs were The Greater Iowa Corporation, its directors, and
three non-director shareholders, none of whom had joined the Iowa
Trust. The plaintiffs claimed that the promoters of the Iowa Trust
violated Rule 10b-5 by making materially misleading statements in
selling the "evidences of ownership" in the Trust, which the plaintiffs claimed were "securities" under the Act.
The Eighth Circuit denied the plaintiffs a private right of action under Rule 10b-5: "As plaintiffs are neither purchasers or sellers of the allegedly fraudulent security and were not the parties
defrauded by a purchase or sale, they are not within the class afforded protection under the Act and implementing Rule."9 " However, the plaintiffs also invoked § 29(b) "assert[ing] the absolute
voidness of the transfers of the Greater Iowa common stock to the
Iowa Trust, and seek[ing] declaratory relief as to the rights created
thereunder. '9 7 The court also denied this line of attack:
[W]e believe the only private party capable of attacking the
validity of these transactions between the Greater Iowa shareholders and the defendants are the shareholders who were allegedly defrauded. The guilty party cannot assert the invalidity of these contracts. Certainly, too, the plaintiffs, as
strangers to the contracts, have no standing to inject them2 See the discussion in section III of the extensive powers courts have to shape remedies under § 29(b).
93 378 F2d 783 (8th Cir 1967).
" Id at 787.
95 Id.
" Id at 791.
'

Id at 792.
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selves between contracting parties and assert the invalidity of
transactions to which the contracting parties are apparently
perfectly content to enter and observe.... Any rights granted
to defendants by these shareholders [those who had joined the
Trust] must, at this time, be observed by the Greater Iowa
Corporation. 8
Given the purposes of Rule 10b-5, this is the correct result.
The plaintiffs in this case were concerned not with the "deceptive"
nature of the trust solicitations but with the threat to their continued control of the corporation. If the plaintiffs were truly concerned that the shareholders were being deceived, the plaintiffs
could have communicated their version of the truth, and let the
shareholders decide for themselves if they had been deceived.
Those shareholders would then have had the opportunity to sue
the Trust organizers under Rule 10b-5 or § 29(b). Neither Rule
10b-5 nor § 29(b) was designed to guard against a manager's loss of
control. Parties who are strangers to both the concern of the statutory scheme and the contract should have no right to litigate the
alleged injuries and defalcations of others.
Texaco would have found itself in exactly this position had it
sued for a declaratory judgment that the Pennzoil/Getty contract
was void before taking the actions that were found to constitute
tortious interference. Since Texaco was not a tendering shareholder it was not the intended beneficiary of the rule. It also was
not a party to any relevant contract with Pennzoil or any Getty
entity at that time.
Still, Texaco claimed that Pennzoil's "side deal" with the
Getty Museum for a slightly earlier payment violated Rule 10b-13.
That rule was promulgated pursuant to the 1968 Williams Act, an
amendment to the 1934 Act that comprehensively regulates tender
offers. In Piper v Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.," the Supreme
Court concluded that when Congress regulated tender offers
through the Williams Act, it intended to protect shareholders, not
competing tender offerors. Unlike shareholders, competing tender
offerors do "not come to the courts in the posture of a hoodwinked
investor victimized by market manipulation."' 10 0 Indeed, granting
such a right would be inconsistent with the Act's attempt to aid
shareholders because "[m]ore likely ... is the prospect that share-

98 Id.
99 430 US 1 (1977).
100 Id at 45.
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holders may be prejudiced" by the fact that such a right would
deter tender offers from ever being made. 10 1
Piper was concerned with whether a competing tender offeror
could maintain an action for damages, but its analysis of the effects of allowing such suits is applicable to § 29(b) as well. Tender
offers would also be deterred if the potential tender offeror knew
that third parties could void any resultant contract because of a
violation of securities laws. If Congress conferred no rights upon
competing tender offerors who could be injured by losing the battle
for the target company and who have acted through legitimate
mechanisms, then a fortiori, they did not intend to confer a right
upon someone who tortiously interfered after a contract had already been reached. 102 To create such a right could injure shareholders, who are the intended beneficiaries of the regulations,
without advancing the statutory policy. Therefore, Texaco had no
standing to invoke § 29(b) to claim that the Pennzoil/Getty contract was void.
III.

REMEDIES UNDER

§

29(B)

Read literally, § 29(b)'s remedy can be extremely harsh-a
complete voiding of any enforceable rights of the violating party. 103
Giant corporate mergers could be wiped out by minor violations of
the securities laws. A party who had already completely performed
but who had violated a securities law could receive no compensation at all for his performance. Innocent parties could reap windfall gains by voiding contracts they had not performed, but that
the guilty party had fully performed.
Not surprisingly, few courts have read the section literally
when faced with such inequitable results. In Mills, the Supreme
Court commented that when § 29(b) is invoked:
Possible forms of relief will include setting aside the merger or
granting other equitable relief, but ... nothing in the statutory policy "requires the court to unscramble a corporate
transaction merely because a violation occurred." In selecting
a remedy the lower courts should exercise "'the sound discreId at 40.
"0I Giving a tortious interferer a defense would effectively privilege third parties to void

101

contracts through wrongful means when they could not do so through litigation.
103 See Occidental Life, 496 F2d at 1265 (noting that if read literally § 29(b) would
have a "devastating meaning"); Pearlstein,429 F2d at 1149 (Friendly dissenting) (noting
the "Draconian language" of § 29(b) but reading it as legislative direction to apply "common-law principles of illegal bargain").
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tion which guides the determinations of courts of equity'"
keeping in mind the role of equity as "the instrument for nice
adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and
private needs as well as between competing private claims."' 1 4
Courts, in following this language from Mills, should keep in
mind that § 29(b) is a remedial provision designed to advance the
substantive provisions of the securities laws and regulations. In
most cases involving individual protection rules, the party seeking
to void the contract will also have a private right of action for
damages. Thus, if an action for damages will make the injured
party whole, and voiding the contract will be inequitable, courts
should not invoke § 29(b).
Such was the case in Occidental Life v Pat Ryan where voiding the contract because of a Rule 10b-5 violation would have resulted in the plaintiff "gain[ing] double its amount of damages," a
result that "would hardly be equitable."' 1 5 The court relegated the
plaintiff to his legal remedy, refusing "to nullify a contract which
has been executed.... especially ...where the parties have other
remedies at their disposal which will produce an equitable result." 0 8 The court interpreted § 29(b) in light of the whole panoply of provisions of the 1934 Act and concluded that "[s]uch an
application of Section 29(b) would serve to nullify those other rem-

edies and substitute a penalty provision. "107
In other cases, courts may not face the question of whether to
void a contract or provide damages. Instead, the case may present
a situation where damages are either unavailable or would be difficult to calculate, and where voiding the contract will be inequitable
because there has been substantial performance. In these cases,
courts should use their equitable powers to fashion a remedy to fit
the case at hand.
The Fifth Circuit did just that in Regional Propertiesv Fin. &
Real Estate Consult..108 There, a disbarred lawyer sold limited
partnership interests in real estate holdings to investors despite
the fact that he had not registered as a securities broker/dealer as
required by § 15(a)(1) of the 1934 Act. 0 9 The general partners
104396 US at 386 (citations omitted).
10 496 F2d at 1267.
10I Id (emphasis in original).
107

Id.

678 F2d 552 (5th Cir 1982).
15 USC § 780(a)(1) (1982) provides in relevant part that "It shall be unlawful for
any broker or dealer.., to ... induce ... the purchase or sale of, any security... unless
such broker or dealer is registered in accordance with subsection (b) of this section."
10-

1
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brought suit when they discovered that the disbarred lawyer was
not a registered broker/dealer, but only after the defendant had
been paid a substantial amount and had rights to several hundred
thousand dollars in an escrow account. In fashioning a remedy
under § 29(b), the district court allowed recovery of the escrowed
funds but denied recovery of fees already paid to the defendant,
reasoning that he had done the work and should be
compensated. 110
The Fifth Circuit approved this result. It held that:
The fact that public policy embodied in the securities laws
prohibits enforcement of the contract is not alone a sufficient
reason to allow even an innocent party to retain an unjust enrichment at the expense of a culpable one.... When the services contracted for have been performed by an unlicensed
person, courts have "nearly always" denied restitution of payments made for such services. Because he has done the work
promised, the unlicensed person who received the fee is not
unjustly enriched. The person who paid his fee has received
actual services. The law, therefore, leaves the parties where it
found them."'
The court decided that since the escrowed funds were to be used
for unpaid debts, "as between Regional [the plaintiff] and Financial [the defendant], this loss ... should fall on the violator of the
2
Act.,""1
This adjustment of remedies is consistent with the Supreme
Court's decision in Mills. It is unlikely that in enacting § 29(b)
Congress meant greater losses to fall on violators based upon fortuities (such as how much performance had been rendered by the
violating party when suit was brought). It is also unlikely that
Congress meant for minor violations to upset enormous transactions. It makes more sense for the courts to fashion remedies to fit
the facts of each case than for them to adopt a simplistic literal
reading that does not advance the real policy of the rules.
That is not to say that § 29(b)'s voiding policy should never be
used. In some cases the injured party discovers the securities violation when there has been little or no performance. The injured
party then refuses to perform, pointing to the securities law violation, and is sued for breach of contract. The injured party can then
110

678 F2d at 555-57.

1, Id at 564 (citations omitted).
112

Id at 565.
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raise § 29(b) defensively.
Such a situation arose in Sundstrand Corp. v Sun Chemical
Corp.11 Upon discovering Rule 10b-5 violations, Sundstrand sued
for damages and refused to perform on a stock purchase option
agreement. The defendant counterclaimed for damages for breach
of contract and Sundstrand raised § 29(b). The court awarded
damages to the plaintiff and held that the 10b-5 violations excused
performance on the stock purchase agreement.1 14
This is a sound result because there had been no performance
before Sundstrand elected to void the contract. Thus, the violating
party lost the benefit of the bargain, but did not lose anything
more. The non-violating party is excused from performing an
agreement procured by illegality, but receives no windfall gain
from not having to pay for already completed performance. The
result is, therefore, equitable without any further adjustments
from the court.
With this in mind, it is doubtful that in the Texaco case a
court would have "unscrambled" the Pennzoil/Getty agreement
because of the alleged Rule 10b-13 violation at issue. All shareholders were to have received the same price under the Pennzoil/
Getty contract. The only difference was that the Getty Museum
might have received its money earlier and benefitted from
whatever interest accrued on those funds between the time it was
paid and the time the tendering shareholders were paid. In the
context of a transaction the size of the Pennzoil/Getty merger, this
difference is negligible. A more equitable remedy would have been
to force Pennzoil to pay the tendering shareholders the same
amount of interest that the Museum received." 5
IV.

SECTION 29(B) AND STATE ILLEGALITY DEFENSES

Section 29(b) may not be the only defense available for parties

113

553 F2d 1033 (7th Cir 1977).

114

Id at 1051.

115It is possible that any added benefit to the Getty Museum would have been offset by
other matters. As the Texas appeals court noted:
IT]he agreement called for the same price to be paid per share for all selling shareholders.... There was testimony that the Museum, and indeed all parties, insisted that all
shareholders were to be treated equally in the Pennzoil transaction, and that the parties all proceeded on this assumption. Pennzoil points out that if the Museum had been
paid for its shares before the public shareholders, any benefit that it might have received from having its shares purchased sooner would have been offset by payment of
Getty's first quarter dividend to those remaining shareholders.
729 SW2d at 807.
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seeking to void contracts illegal under the securities laws. Section
29(b) is often raised defensively in breach of contract actions.
Since contract actions are state law causes of action, the defenses
to such actions are usually controlled by state law. Many states
recognize a defense when the underlying contract violates the law
in some way."' This section explores the interplay between these
state law illegality defenses and § 29(b). Specifically, it looks at the
question of whether a state illegality defense is relevant at all when
it is a federal law, such as Rule 10b-5, that makes the contract
illegal. While state courts must allow parties to whom § 29(b) provides a defense to avoid a contract, the question explored here is
whether state courts can also allow parties who would not have a
federal defense under § 29(b) to use state illegality defenses to
avoid a contract illegal under federal law.
A.

Federal Precedent

One reason a state may not be able to expand the group of
parties who can take advantage of illegality under the federal securities laws is simply that these laws were passed to advance certain federal policies and they provide exclusively for federal beneficiaries. Giving a defense to individuals not covered by § 29(b) may
not advance these policies. However, in the absence of a conflict
with the purposes of the federal statute, a state would not be refusing to enforce federal law, but would be expanding the effect of
the securities laws by allowing the defense. The question raised,
then, is whether states can give additional effect to federal
statutes.
Federal precedent indicates that they cannot. In Kelly v
Kosuga, for example, the Supreme Court stated that "state law
governs in general the rights and duties of sellers and purchasers
of goods, [but] ...the effect of illegality under a federal statute is
a matter of federal law ... even in diversity actions in the federal
' 1 7 Kelly
courts after Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.""
involved a contract
action in which the defendant attempted to interpose the state law
"' For cases involving state illegality defenses, see Schmidt v Town of Alvin, 429
NW2d 541, 145 Wis 2d 806 (Wis App 1988); Accountemps v Birch Tree Group, 539 A2d
1261, 224 NJ Super 163 (Sup Ct NJ 1988); Daye v Roberts, 365 SE2d 660, 89 NC App 344
(NC Ct App 1988); McGinley v Massey, 525 A2d 1076, 17 Md App 352 (Ct App MD 1987).
For cases involving § 29(b) raised in state courts, see Hinnant v American Nat'l Bank, 406
S2d 1206 (Ct App Fla 1981); Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Feldman,439 NYS2d 975, 109
Misc 2d 403 (Civ Ct NY 1980); Chicago Corp. v. Jordan,411 NYS2d 116, 96 Misc 2d 1040
(NY S Ct 1978); UFITEC v Carter, 571 P2d 990, 20 Cal 3d 238 (1977).
11 358 US 516, 519 (1959) (citations omitted).
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defense of illegality based on a violation of the federal Sherman
Act. The Court held that "the Sherman Act's express remedies
could not be added to judicially by including the avoidance of private contracts as a sanction." 118 Similarly, allowing parties to raise
a state illegality defense when § 29(b) does not afford them a federal defense would amount to judicial expansion
of the express
i9
remedies contained in the securities laws."
In Rothberg v Rosenbloom, the Third Circuit applied this general reasoning to a contract action involving the securities laws. 20
In that case, the plaintiff brought suit seeking recovery on two
promissory notes that the defendant claimed arose out of transactions in violation of Rule 10b-5. The district court held that the
claim was barred by the Pennsylvania illegality defense and by the
federal in pari delicto defense. The Third Circuit reversed, holding
that the state illegality defense was irrelevant and that federal law
controlled:
We see no need to consider the defense of illegality under
Pennsylvania law because the public policy, even as alluded to
by the district court, is one that underlies federal securities
law, not Pennsylvania law. Therefore, the analysis with respect to the illegality defense is governed by federal law, not
state law.' 2 '
B. Concern for Uniform Application of Federal Law
In Wisconsin Dept. of Industry v Gould Inc.,12 the Supreme
Court relied on a concern for the uniform application and effect of
federal law to invalidate a state labor policy. Wisconsin had
adopted a policy of barring repeat violators of the National Labor
Relations Act from doing business with the state. The Court struck
down the Wisconsin policy holding that the NLRA prevented
states "not only from setting forth standards of conduct inconsistent with the substantive requirements of the NLRA, but also
118 Id

(citing D. R. Wilder Mfg. Co. v Corn ProductsRefining Co., 236 US 165 (1915)).
"When a federal statute condemns an act as unlawful, the extent and nature of the
legal consequences of the condemnation, though left by the .statute to judicial determination, are nevertheless federal questions, the answers to which are to be derived from the
statute and the federal policy which it has adopted." Sola Electric Co. v Jefferson Co., 317
US 173, 176 (1942).
"1

120 808 F2d 252 (3d Cir 1986).
121 Id at 254 n 2. The concurring

and dissenting judges agreed. See id at 259 (Seitz
concurring), and id at 261-62 (Sloviter dissenting).
122 475 US 282 (1986).
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from providing their own regulatory or judicial remedies for conduct prohibited... by the Act. '123 Such additional remedies were
prohibited "because 'the range and nature of those remedies that
are and are not available is a fundamental part' of the comprehensive system established by Congress. ' 124 While the Court finds preemption in the labor law context more readily than it does in other
contexts, 125 the logic of forbidding additional state remedies for
federal law violations seems to apply generally and is consistent
with the Third Circuit's holding in Rothberg.
C.

Limits on State Regulatory Power

An additional justification for a limitation on the state illegality defense stems from the proposition that a state should be without power to punish conduct that it cannot regulate. While states
are free to regulate the securities aspects of some transactions, 2 '
the Commerce Clause limits state securities law regulations. A
state can only regulate securities when there is a significant nexus
between the corporation being regulated and the state. Thus, in
Edgar v MITE Corp.,27 the Court invalidated an Illinois regulation of tender offers on Commerce Clause grounds because the law
applied any time 10 percent of the shares of a corporation were
owned by Illinois residents. Since the law could apply when 90 percent of the shareholders resided out of state, it could conceivably
"regulate a tender offer which would not affect a single Illinois
shareholder.' 2 8 Thus, the "Illinois statute [was] a direct restraint
on interstate commerce and . . . [had] a sweeping extraterritorial
effect."' 29
In upholding a somewhat similar Indiana statute against Commerce Clause attack in CTS Corp. v Dynamics Corp. of
America, 3 0 the Court distinguished MITE on the grounds that the
"Illinois law... applied as well to out-of-state corporations as to

"2

Id at 286.

124 Id at 287, quoting Motor Coach Employees v Lockridge, 403 US 274, 287 (1971).
126 Compare Golden State Transit v Los Angeles, 475 US 608 (1986) (city prevented

from conditioning extension of franchise agreement on settlement of labor dispute), with
CTS Corp. v Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 US 69 (1987) (Williams Act does not preempt state anti-takeover statute).
126 Federal securities laws do not occupy the field of securities such that all state securities regulation is pre-empted. See CTS Corp., 481 US 69.
'" 457 US 624 (1982).
1' Id at 642.

22 Id.
120 481 US 69 (1987).
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in-state corporations. We agree that Indiana has no interest in protecting non-resident shareholders of non-resident corporations.
But this Act applies only to corporations incorporated in Indiana.' 131 Thus, only the state of incorporation of the target company can regulate tender offers. If the state whose contract law is
being applied is not the state of incorporation, the state has no
power to regulate the tender offer at issue. Unless the state of incorporation has passed legislation outlawing the same conduct as
the federal regulation, as well as a broader analog to § 29(b), no
government with the power to regulate the securities aspects of the
transaction has granted a defense to a breach of contract action. A
state with no power to issue a regulation has no power to punish a
violation of the regulation beyond the punishment provided by the
federal government.
D.

The Impact of Merrell Dow

One could argue that the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Merrell Dow PharmaceuticalsInc. v Thompson'3 ' contradicts the
pre-emption analysis just presented. In Merrell Dow, the plaintiffs
claimed that Dow was liable under state law theories of negligence,
breach of warranty, strict liability, fraud, and gross negligence in
their manufacture and distribution of the drug Benedectin. The
complaint alleged that children of mothers ingesting the drug were
born deformed.' 33 The core of the plaintiffs' theory of liability was
that "the drug Benedectin was 'misbranded' in violation of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)3T . .. because its
labeling did not provide adequate warning that its use was potentially dangerous."' 3 5 The plaintiffs alleged that the violation of the
federal statute created a rebuttable presumption of negligence
under state law.' 36 The Merrell Dow Court "conclude[d] that a
complaint alleging a violation of a federal statute as an element of
a state cause of action, when Congress has determined that there
should be no private federal cause of action" does not arise under
37
federal law, and thus let stand the plaintiff's state law claim.
This holding might be read as allowing states to recognize

132

Id at 93 (emphasis in original).
478 US 804 (1986).

133Id

at 805.

13421 USC § 301 et seq (1982).

135478 US 805-06.
136Id at 806.
137 Id at 817.
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state causes of action for the violation of federal statutes even
when the federal government has chosen not to provide such
causes of action. This would seem to contradict the argument that
states cannot provide broader remedies for the violation of federal
law than the federal government has provided.
Initially, however, several points distinguish the Merrell Dow
holding from the question of whether a state can provide additional remedies for violation of a federal statute. First, in Merrell
Dow the state did not provide any remedy for a violation of the
FDCA. The statute was merely used as a proxy for a standard of
ordinary care. Since the presumption of negligence was rebuttable,
the plaintiff could have proved a violation of the statute and still
not recovered. Thus, a violation of the statute, while illegal under
federal law, may not have been negligent under state law. Second,
the question at issue in Merrell Dow was whether there was original federal court jurisdiction because of the use of federal statute
to set the standard of care, not whether federal law controlled the
construction of the statute. 13 8 Indeed, the Court supported the arguments concerning the limits on state regulatory power by making clear that federal law did control the construction of the
statute:
To the extent that [Merrell Dow] is arguing that state use and
interpretation of the FDCA pose a threat to the order and stability of the FDCA regime, petitioner should be arguing, not
that federal courts should be able to review and enforce state
FDCA-based causes of action as an aspect of federal-question
jurisdiction, but that the FDCA pre-empts state court jurisdiction over the issue in dispute. Petitioner's concern about
the uniformity of interpretation, moreover, is considerably
mitigated by the fact that, even if there is no original district
court jurisdiction for these kinds of action, this Court retains
power to review the decision of a federal issue in a state cause
of action." 9
The Court emphasized this distinction between original federal court jurisdiction and federal control over interpretation of a
federal statute by quoting the proposition, from Moore v Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. that:
138 If the presumption were irrebuttable, however, the case would be different since
then the state would be creating a private remedy for violation of a federal statute despite
Congress's intention that there be no private remedy.
"' Merrell Dow, 478 US at 816 (footnotes omitted).
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[q]uestions . . .relating to the scope or construction of the
Federal Safety Appliance Acts are, of course, federal questions
which may appropriately be reviewed in this Court.... But it
does not follow that a suit brought under [a] state statute...
[that] brings within the purview of the statute a breach of the
duty imposed by the federal statute, should be regarded as a
suit arising under the laws of the United States and cognizable in the federal court in the absence of diversity of
citizenship. 4 °
Thus, Merrell Dow stands for the proposition that not all
causes of action that contain federal questions arise under federal
law. However, it also supports the notion that a state court's decision as to the scope and construction of a federal statute is controlled by federal interpretation. Thus, more expansive interpretations by the states are not permitted.
Additional support for the theory that Congress intended the
federal courts to control the interpretation of the securities laws
can be garnered from the fact that Congress vested the federal
courts with "exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or
the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and
actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by
this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder.'' The only
way that issues touching upon the federal securities laws or rules
can ever be raised in a state court is defensively. This provides
evidence of a congressional intention to promote a uniform interpretation of the rules.
When Congress chooses a range of statutory remedies, it balances the need to ensure compliance with the statute with the need
to avoid over-deterrence that might cause people to avoid legitimate, beneficial activities. In the case of § 29(b), for example, expanding the class of people who could take advantage of a violation of Rule 10b-13, might over-deter tender offerors by opening
up the possibility of lengthy and costly litigation with third parties
even if the tender offer is successful. A state's expansion of remedies could upset the balance the federal policy has struck.
V.

CONCLUSION

Courts should avoid adopting per se rules when deciding when
140 Id

(1934).
141

at 816 n 14, quoting Moore v Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 291 US 205, 214-15

15 USC § 78aa (1982).
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and how to apply § 29(b). Since § 29(b) is a remedial provision, it
advances no substantive policy of its own. Instead, the substantive
policy is contained in the other sections of the Exchange Act and
in rules and regulations passed pursuant to the Act. The policies
underlying these rules should guide courts in applying § 29(b).
This comment has proposed a broad framework for implementing § 29(b) in the many different contexts it could be invoked.
Additionally, the comment has discussed the proper approach
courts should take in fashioning remedies under § 29(b) so as to
promote equitable outcomes. Lastly, the comment has argued that
§ 29(b) exclusively governs which parties can take advantage of illegality under the federal securities laws in breach of contract actions and that state illegality defenses cannot be used to broaden
this class.

